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ABSTRACT
HOW COMMUNICATION AND CONFIRMATORY STRATEGIES 
AFFECT THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH
by
Michael E. Gorman 
University of New Hampshire, May, 1981
Scientific reasoning has become a topic of recent psy­
chological research. Studies have focused on Karl Popper's 
idea that scientists should try to falsify, or disconfirm, 
their hypotheses instead of verifying them. Results indi­
cate that both scientists and college students prefer to use 
confirmatory logic on simple tasks that model scientific 
reasoning. The only attempt to instruct subjects to use 
disconfirmatory reasoning failed (Mynatt, Doherty & Tweney, 
1977) though subjects that falsified on their own initiative 
were more successful than subjects who tried to confirm.
All the studies of scientific reasoning have focused on 
individuals. But major advances in science are often made 
by groups, e.g., the research teams that discovered the 
structure of DNA and developed the atomic bomb. Experimental 
studies of group problem-solving have compared the perfor­
mance of interacting groups with that of concocted groups com­
posed of an equal number of individuals working separately. 
When there is a single, right answer to a problem, interacting
vii
groups perforin about as well as the best member of each 
equally large concocted group, but better than the average 
person working alone.
This thesis synthesizes the literatures on scientific 
reasoning and group problem-solving by combining their two 
major variables in a single study. Commun i cat ion was mani­
pulated by running subjects in groups of four and either tel­
ling them to interact or to work separately. Strategy was 
manipulated by instructing subjects to follow either dis­
confirmatory or confirmatory approaches to the task, which 
was based on New Eleusis, a card-game designed to model the 
"search for truth." Each group had to solve the same four 
increasingly difficult Eleusis problems.
The overall design was a 2 (interacting vs. non­
interacting) X 2 (disconfirmatory vs. confirmatory) X 4 
(the Eleusis problems) split plot. Analyses-of-variance were 
conducted on the number of correct solutions and the time-to- 
solution achieved by groups in each condition.
Even though a manipulation-check revealed that discon­
firmatory groups did try to follow their suggested strategy, 
there were no significant differences in the performances 
of confirmatory and disconfirmatory groups. This result 
replicates Mynatt et al.'s (1977) earlier research.
Interacting groups performed no better than the best 
member of each non-interacting group, where the best is de­
fined as the person who solved each rule in the least time. 
Interacting groups also took significantly more time. But
viii
interacting groups did solve a significantly higher percen­
tage of problems (80%) than all non-interacting individuals 
combined (33%). These results replicate earlier research on 
group problem-solving (Steiner, 1972).
A follow-up study, using the same task and interacting 
groups, revealed that disconfirmatory instructions produce 
superior performance when subjects have maximum freedom to 
design their own experiments. When the range of possible 
experiments is limited, confirmatory groups may serendipi- 
tously disconfirm their hypotheses.
A discussion of the implications of these results for 
science and suggestions for future research were included in 
the thesis.
INTRODUCTION
The focus of the thesis presented here is an experimen­
tal investigation of how two factors affect groups' attempts 
to solve a series of problems that model scientific reason­
ing. The paper is divided into four sections. The first 
section, "Studies of Scientific Reasoning," contains the 
background and rationale for the present study. The second 
section, "Methods," describes the details of the design and 
the third section, "Results," contains the quantitative 
findings. The final, "Discussion" section ties the results 
back in with themes presented in the first section.
I. STUDIES OF SCIENTIFIC REASONING
In the last 100 years, with the development of satel­
lites, atomic energy, skyscrapers, radio and television, 
etc., the human environment has changed more than in the 
preceding 10,000. These changes have not affected all parts 
of the world equally: the developing nations have been less
affected than the industrial ones. But most people now live 
in a very different world than the one their grandparents 
were born into.
Science has played a major role in all these changes.
2The classic example is Einstein's E=MC , a purely theoretical 
equation. It never occurred to Einstein that his formula 
could actually be applied to a technological problem. But 
at Hiroshima, Einstein's equation was translated into action—  
with horrifying results.
Science is not solely responsible for major advances 
in technology. Animal husbandrists had developed excellent 
breeding techniques long before Darwin and Mendel explained 
how their techniques worked. But the more recent discovery 
of the structure of DNA has opened the way to a whole set of 
applications that would have been impossible without that 
major scientific advance. Sometimes the scientific advance 
follows the technological one— but usually the order is 
reversed.
To understand the new world created by technology, it
2
3is necessary to understand science. Modern scholars in var­
ious disciplines have begun to study science in earnest.
Gerald Holton (1973), Thomas Kuhn (1970) and others have 
thoroughly demolished the notion that science progresses in 
an orderly linear fashion, with one discovery leading inevi­
tably to the next.
The progress of Science is generally regarded as a kind 
of clean, rational advance along a straight ascending 
line; in fact it has followed a zig-zag course, at times 
almost more bewildering than the evolution of political 
thought. The history of cosmic theories, in particular, 
may without exaggeration be called a history of collec­
tive obsessions and controlled schizophrenias; and the 
manner in which some of the most important individual 
discoveries were arrived at reminds one more of a sleep­
walker's performance than an electronic brain's 
(Koestler, 1963, p. 15).
Koestler exaggerates the irrational element in science, but 
even scientists themselves have little sympathy with tradi­
tional views of the scientist. As Agnew and Pyke (1969) 
note, "We suspect that there are those who . . . will say 
that the researcher must be completely dedicated to objec­
tivity, that he is only interested in the truth. Perhaps 
there are researchers like that. We haven't met enough to 
fill a phone booth" (p. 162).
Scientists are not totally objective, dispassionate ob­
servers and science has not progressed in a completely ration­
al manner. But there has been progress: modern scientific
theories can predict and explain a much wider range of events 
than their predecessors of a hundred years ago. The modern 
theory of plate tectonics, for example, accounts for a mass
4of geological data that no previous theory could have handled 
(Gould, 1977).
Falsification as a Demarcation Between 
Science and Non-Science 
The philosopher Karl Popper (1962, 1976) concedes that 
the way in which scientific discoveries are made is often 
non-rational. But he claims the way in which they are tested 
is rational— or at least potentially rational. Einstein's 
General Theory of Relativity is Popper's favorite example.
When he proposed the theory, Einstein also proposed an empir­
ical test that could refute it. He predicted that beams from 
a distant star would be bent a certain amount by the sun's 
gravitational field. During an eclipse, the British physi­
cist A. S. Eddington found that light from a star near the 
sun was bent by the sun's gravity in the manner predicted by 
Einstein. General Relativity had not been disconfirmed by 
an empirical test.
Note that it is not correct to say that Einstein's theory 
had been confirmed by an empirical observation. That is the 
logical fallacy called 'affirming the consequent.' Another 
theory can always be constructed that will make the same pre­
diction. In fact, other hypotheses besides Einstein's have 
been proposed that account for Eddington's observation 
(Kaufmann, 1973).
Restating the problem in logical terms will make it 
clearer. Scientific predictions are "if, then" statements: 
if hypothesis p is true, then event q will be observed.
5There are or.ly two forms of valid arguments involving one
if, then statement and another, non-binary statement:
/
1. Modus ponens: Hypothesis p is true. Then event q will
be observed.
2. Modus tollens: Event q is not observed when hypothesis 
p predicts it should be. Then p is false.
If q is observed, that says nothing about whether p is 
true. An alternative hypothesis h might also predict that q 
would have occurred.
Popper's point is that modus tollens is the only viable 
form of scientific inference for testing hypotheses. Even 
modus ponens isn't useful because a scientist cannot know 
a priori that a hypothesis is true. The logical conclusion 
is that a hypothesis can never be proved right, but it can 
withstand repeated attempts to prove it wrong using modus 
tollens.
Another line of reasoning that supports Popper's can 
be derived from Hume's critique of induction (Popper, 1962). 
Put simply, Hume showed that one can never infer truth about 
the future by observation, because one cannot assume the 
future will be like the past. "Bertrand Russell once specu­
lated that the chicken on slaughter-day might reason that 
whenever the humans came it had been fed, so when the humans 
would come today it would also be fed. The chicken thought 
that the future would resemble the past, but it was dead 
wrong" (Skyrms, 1966, p. 27). In the same way, even though 
scientific equations have given accurate predictions in the
6past, we can never be absolutely sure they will continue to 
do so in the future.
Again, the point is that no amount of evidence will 
prove that a theory about the universe is right, but one con­
tradictory piece of evidence can prove it wrong. So, despite 
Hume's critique, scientific progress is still possible.
What scientists should do is develop theories that make fal- 
sifiable predictions and then try to disprove them. Those 
theories that are not falsified represent the closest ap­
proximations to the truth available. Eventually, they may 
be disproved and replaced by other, better theories that 
account for even more evidence. The classic example is 
Newtonian mechanics, which were scientific gospel until 
Einstein's General Relativity came along and accounted for 
some evidence— like the perturbations in Mercury's orbit—  
that Newton's theory could not explain (Einstein and Infeld, 
1938) .
How does one distinguish between General Relativity and 
its competitors, if some of the competitors make the same pre­
dictions as Einstein's theory? Popper says that the best 
theory is the one which forbids the most, i.e., makes the most 
potentially falsifiable predictions. Theories like Marxism 
and psychoanalysis that make no falsifiable predictions are 
not scientific. No matter what neurosis you bring to a 
psychoanalyst, he or she will always be able to explain it 
in Freudian— or Adlerian, or Jungian— terms. No matter what 
world event occurs, a Marxist will always be able to explain
7it in terms of the struggle between classes. These theories 
forbid nothing: they make no predictions that can be dis­
proved. Their explanations are deceptive: they can explain
what has happened, but they cannot make specific, falsifiable 
predictions about future events, as Einstein did.
So, according to Popper, the demarcation between science 
and non-science is that all scientific theories are falsi­
fiable: they make predictions that potentially can be dis­
proved. Science approaches the truth by discarding ideas that 
are wrong, not by proving ideas right. Even Einstein's 
theories may someday be supplanted by better approximations 
to the truth.
The fact that many scientific ideas are the products of 
intuition rather than reason does not bother Popper. It does 
not matter where a scientific idea comes from: it matters
only that it make falsifiable predictions. If the idea is 
ridiculous, it will be disproved immediately.
Problems with Popper's Demarcation
Historians of science like Kuhn (1970) have shown not 
only that individual scientific ideas often arise from irra­
tional sources but also that scientific theories are not 
always accepted or rejected based on the science. For example, 
Einstein's special theory of relativity was initially falsi­
fied, in an experiment by the eminent physicist Walter 
Kaufmann. His results supported theories that differed from 
Einstein's. Einstein was not at all dismayed; as far as he 
was concerned, the ad hoc character of the other theories
8rendered them highly unlikely (Holton, 1973). About ten 
years later, it was discovered that Kaufmann's equipment 
had been inadequate to conduct the test. Einstein had re­
fused to let a single experiment sway his opinion, even though 
he had agreed that— at the time at least— there were no pro­
blems with the way the experiment had been done.
Popper would respond by arguing that falsification is 
an ideal. Whether scientists have practiced it in the past 
or not is irrelevant. The important thing is that they should 
practice falsification in the future.
But the Einstein example raises problems with falsifi­
cation as an ideal. Einstein was correct to stick to his 
theory despite evidence to the contrary. Sometimes, falsi- 
ficatory evidence should be ignored.
Also, even if we accept falsification as a scientific 
ideal, it does not serve to demarcate science from non-science. 
There are major scientific areas that are based on non- 
falsifiable theories. Popper himself admits that "Darwinism 
is not a testable'scientific theory, but a metaphysical re­
search programme— a possible framework for testable scientific 
theories" (1976, p. 168). Like Marxism, Darwinism can be used 
to explain any event within its theoretical domain— any new 
discovery in the fossil record, any new and strange form of 
life. Evolution cannot be used to predict the specific course 
of an organism's development, but it can account for the past 
development of any organism.
According to Popper, the only major prediction made by
9Darwin's theory is that changes produced by selection working 
on variation will be gradual. Small variations in an organ­
ism are selected by the environment until, over many genera­
tions, the species is transformed. This prediction has not 
been falsified by anything in the fossil record. But it is 
hard to derive other testable predictions from evolutionary 
theory.
Much of modern biology is based on evolution. Is biology 
a science? Not if its major theoretical framework is not 
falsifiable. Popper's demarcation excludes biology from the 
sciences.
There are theories outside of science that fulfill 
Popper's falsification criterion. Tradition held that the 
first five books of the Bible were written by Moses. This 
idea can be translated into a falsifiable hypothesis: if
the first five books exhibit strong stylistic and thematic 
inconsistencies that suggest they were written by several 
authors, they could not have been written by Moses. In 
fact, modern Biblical scholars have used this kind of rea­
soning to prove that Moses could not have written the first 
five books and that at least four different authors are re­
sponsible (see The Oxford Annotated Bible, 1962, p. xxiv).
Is Biblical scholarship a science?
How about history? Good historical theories can be 
falsified. Take, for example, the common notion that 
Einstein's theory of special relativity was inspired, in 
large part, by the Michelson-Morley experiment. Gerald Holton
10
(1973) showed that Einstein was not even aware of this ex­
periment at the time he wrote his famous 1905 paper.
Popper has proposed an ideal: every scientific theory
should be open to disconfirmation. But why limit the ideal 
to science? Fields that are not traditionally scientific 
can also generate falsifiable hypotheses.
Should scientists— and other scholars— concentrate on 
falsifying their theories, rather than verifying them? 
Recently, a few researchers have begun to explore this ques­
tion— using the scientific method.
Using Science to Study Confirmatory Reasoning
In the preface to his book Scientist as Subject: The
Psychological Imperative, Michael J. Mahoney (1976) noted 
that, "Relative to the last century— or even the last decade 
— today's scientists know quite a bit about virtually every- 
thnig on our planet— with one ironic exception. The excep­
tion, of course, i£ the scientist" (p. xi). According to 
him, historians and sociologists have given us mainly "bio­
graphies and social systems analyses so that we are still 
left with a very meager understanding of the psychology of 
the scientist" (p. xii).
Mahoney and others have recently set out to remedy this 
defect by doing experiments and surveys designed to increase 
our understanding of how scientists reason. The focus of 
these studies has been on whether scientists— and ordinary 
college students— can successfully employ falsification 
on problems that model scientific logic.
11
Mahoney and Kimper (1976) gave a questionnaire to 400 
scientists which included a test of their logical reasoning 
skills. The scientists were asked to pick which of four 
types of inference were valid and were given a specific 
example to see whether they could use each type correctly.
They were told to assume "if p, then q," then asked which 






Only the first (modus ponens) and fourth (modus tollens) are 
valid. The second is the fallacy called 'affirming the con­
sequent' and the third is the fallacy called 'denying the 
antecedent.'
The specific example asked scientists to "Assume that 
the four boxes which are presented below are actually cards 
which each have a letter on one side and a number on the 
other side. You are asked to test the hypothesis that— for 
these 4 cards— if a vowel appears on one side, then an even 
number will appear on the other side. Your "testing," of 
course, will involve turning one or more cards over"
(Mahoney, 1976, p. 189). The first box had an e in it, the 
second an m, the third an 8 and the fourth a 1_. The two cri­
tical cards are one (modus ponens) and four (modus tollens).
Eighty-two scientists returned the survey. They included
12
physicists, biologists, psychologists and sociologists. "Few­
er than eight per cent of the scientists were able to iden­
tify the irrelevant 'experiments' in the analogue hypothesis- 
testing task. Fewer than ten per cent correctly selected the 
experiments which had the critical potential of falsifying 
the sample hypothesis. Likewise, although the vast majority 
of subjects were able to recognize the validity of modus 
ponens (confirmation) and the invalidity of affirming the 
consequent, almost 30 per cent of the social scientists in­
correctly rated denying the antecedent as a valid form of 
reasoning. Most interesting, perhaps, is the finding that 
over half of the scientists did not recognize modus tollens 
(disconfirmation) as being logically valid" (Mahoney, 1976, 
pp. 192-19 3)..
Mahoney could not guarantee that his sample was repre­
sentative, because not all the scientists he contacted re­
turned his survey. But of the ones who did, over half did 
not recognize the logical validity of falsification and even 
more had trouble applying it in a simple example.
Kern, Mirels and Hinshaw (Note 1) gave a questionnaire 
similar to Mahoney's to a sample of seventy-two faculty mem­
bers— psychologists, biologists and physicists— from a large 
midwestern university. Half the sample were given logical pro­
blems written in abstract form (if p, then q) and half in con­
crete form (if Rex is a terrier, then he likes apples). Kern 
et al. used the following problem to express modus tollens in 
concrete form (Kern, Mirels & Hinshaw, 1980):
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"Given: If Rex is a terrier, then he likes apples.
Observation: Rex does not like apples.
Conclusion: a) Rex is not a terrier.
b) Rex is a terrier.
c) Rex likes apples.
d) None of the conclusions seem to follow 
logically" (p. 23).
Thirty per cent of the scientists surveyed did not select 
the proper response (a) to the above question, indicating 
that they could not correctly apply modus tollens to a speci­
fic example. Half the scientists presented with modus tollens 
in its abstract form failed to recognize its logical vali­
dity, replicating Mahoney's findings. Kern et al.'s sample 
was somewhat more representative: all those contacted re­
sponded, but all the scientists were from the same university.
The questions used in these surveys are not perfectly 
analogous to the research situations faced by working scien­
tists. But it is still surprising that so many respondents 
failed to make proper use of falsification, even when given 
concrete problems.
Another replication of this pattern of results is pro­
vided by Einhorn and Hogarth (19 78) who used a sample of 
subjects "known to have been trained in examining possible 
disconfirming evidence" (p. 399)— twenty-three statisticians 
at the University of London. Statisticians are formally 
trained in hypothesis-testing, including conditions under 
which a hypothesis should be rejected.
14
Einhorn and Hogarth asked statisticians to indicate 
which of four outcomes could be used to evaluate a claim:
"when a particular consultant says the market will rise (i.e.,
a favorable report) it always does rise" (Einhorn & Hogarth,
p. 399). The four outcomes were:
"1. favorable report.
2. unfavorable report.
3. rise in the market.
4. fall in the market" (p. 399).
Only five of the statisticians indicated both critical 
outcomes: one (confirmatory) and four (disconfirmatory).
Twelve selected the confirmatory outcome alone. Like Mahoney's 
scientists, most of the statisticians recognized the validity 
of modus ponens but not modus tollens.
The confirmatory bias shown by scientists and statis­
ticians is shared by college students. Wason (1977) gave 
students a numerical triad (2, 4, 6) and told them the 
triad conformed to a simple mathematical rule. To discover 
the rule, subjects were allowed to try as many other three- 
number strings as they wanted, and the experimenter told 
them whether each was right or wrong. Subjects were run 
singly. When each was confident that he or she had discov­
ered the rule, he or she told the experimenter.
Out of twenty-nine subjects, twenty-two "announced at 
least one incorrect rule, nine of these announced a second 
incorrect rule, and two of these nine announced a third 
incorrect rule. Six subjects announced the correct rule
15
without any incorrect ones, and the results showed that 
these subjects varied their hypotheses much more frequently 
than those who announced one incorrect rule" (Wason, 1977, 
pp. 308-309). Most of the students tried to verify their 
guesses, instead of falsifying them. If a student decided 
that numbers in a triad must go up by twos, he or she would 
often announce several strings like 8, 10, 12 and 4, 6, 8 
to test that idea. When the experimenter confirmed that these 
strings were correct, the student often concluded that his 
or her guess was correct— even though many alternatives had 
not been explored. The few subjects who got the correct 
answer without any incorrect guesses varied their hypotheses 
more than the other subjects. In addition, they used strings 
that would tend to disconfirm their guesses, e.g. , 2, 3, 4, 
to test whether a difference of two is really necessary. 
Finally, these subjects were more conservative about making 
a guess; they waited until they had thoroughly tested their 
hypotheses before announcing them to the experimenter (see 
Wason, 1977, pp. 309-310 for some examples of subjects' 
strategies).
Wason's study showed both that college students prefer 
confirmatory evidence and that those college students who 
tried to disconfirm their ideas did better on a simple 
problem-solving task.
Mahoney and DeMonbreun (19 75; reported in Mahoney, 1976) 
used Wason's task on a different subject population: psy­
chologists, physical scientists and Protestant ministers.
16
They chose fifteen representatives from each group. The 
only two errorless subjects were ministers. Scientists used 
slightly fewer disconfirmatory trials and tended to be more 
speculative: they generated more hypotheses than the minis­
ters and returned to a previously falsified hypothesis more 
often. This result contradicts the traditional image of 
the scientist as more conservative and cautious about pro­
posing new hypotheses. The small sample-size in Mahoney's 
study raises questions about whether it generalizes to the 
larger population of scientists, but the results are provo­
cative, nonetheless.
Some support for Mahoney's conclusions comes from 
another, nonexperimental study. Mitroff (19 74) observed 
the reactions of forty-two geoscientists to the Apollo 
missions. Many had committed themselves to major hypotheses 
concerning what Apollo would find. Mitroff interviewed 
them at various times across the course of the Apollo mis­
sions. He found that some of these scientists tended to 
seek evidence confirming their hypotheses and discredited 
contradictory evidence. Like Mahoney's subjects, they stuck 
to their hypotheses even after it became apparent that they 
had been falsified. Moreover, a number of scientists ar­
gued that this kind of commitment and bias in science was 
a good thing. As noted earlier, initial experimental evi­
dence disconfirmed Einstein's special theory of relativity 
but he correctly dismissed the evidence.
An elegant study with introductory psychology students
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provides added evidence for a confirmatory bias on the part 
of most individuals involved in scientific problem-solving. 
Mynatt, Doherty and Tweney (1977) created a scientific 'en­
vironment' using a computer terminal which displayed three 
shapes: triangles, squares and discs. Each shape was either
completely lit or half lit.
Forty-five subjects were seated individually at termi­
nals and told how they could make a small lighted dot or 
'particle' move across the screen, through a field which con­
tained a specific arrangement of triangles, squares and 
discs. Each subject was supposed to come up with a hypothesis 
that would account for the motion of the particles. They 
were given one of three kinds of instructions: disconfirma­
tory, confirmatory, or instructions that merely told them 
they should test their ideas. The confirmatory and discon- 
firmatory instructions included a historical example of each.
The only rule governing the motion of particles was 
that when a particle came within four centimeters of the 
center of a half-lit figure, it stopped. But the environ­
ments the subjects faced were arranged so that it appeared 
triangles might play some role in stopping motion: all
triangles that appeared in the first two screens the subjects 
faced were either half-lit or within the boundary of a half­
lit figure. As a result, twenty subjects formed initial tri­
angle hypotheses, while only twelve had hypotheses concerning 
brightness and thirteen had various other ideas.
After their first two screens, subjects were showed
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photographs of other screens— including different arrangements 
of shapes and brightness— and asked which ones they would 
like to use to test their hypotheses. Some screens were de­
signed so that they would provide confirmatory evidence for 
a triangle hypothesis; others were arranged so that it would 
be easy to disconfirm such a hypothesis. Of the twenty sub­
jects who decided initially on a triangle hypothesis, fifteen 
initially chose confirmatory screens. This tendency con­
tinued: the twenty 'triangle' subjects selected confirmatory
screens on over seventy per cent of their choices.
Then subjects were given the opportunity to fire parti­
cles at either the screens they had chosen or ones they had 
not. Eleven of the 'triangle' subjects obtained evidence 
falsifying their hypothesis and ten of these achieved the 
correct solution. Of the other nine, only four were ulti­
mately correct.
The instructions to either confirm, disconfirm or test 
had no effect on whether individuals arrived at the correct 
solution. The only thing that made a difference was the 
initial hypothesis. If subjects focused on brightness right 
away, they got it. If they focused on something else, they 
did considerably worse.
This study supports Wason's observation that introduc­
tory psychology students, like scientists, prefer to confirm 
hypotheses, rather than falsify them. In Mynatt et al.'s 
study, once subjects obtained evidence falsifying a theory, 
they were able to use it. But in Mahoney's study with
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DeMonbreum (using Wason's task) scientists showed a persis­
tent tendency to return to their initial hypotheses, despite 
falsifying evidence. Are introductory psychology students 
better able to evaluate disconfirmatory evidence than working 
scientists? Two studies provide too slim a basis for such 
a generalization— especially when the studies use entirely 
different tasks. Nonetheless, it is an intriguing finding, 
and might be explained by the fact that norms governing pub­
lication and advancement in most sciences reward those whose 
hypotheses are confirmed. A study by Spencer, Hartnett and 
Mahoney (Note 2) showed that journal referees in psychology 
preferred confirmatory results to disconfirmatory ones.
Could scientists be systematically biased towards confirma­
tion?
All of the scientific problem-solving studies cited 
above concluded that there is a significant advantage to 
disconfirmation, even though only two of the studies, Wason's 
and Mynatt et al.'s, demonstrated the advantage on an actual 
problem-solving task. Only one study— Mynatt's— actually 
involved training subjects to use disconfirmatory reasoning 
and the training manipulation in that study produced no ef­
fects. Presumably, subjects ignored it. Clearly, there is a 
need for further research in this area. If disconfirmation is 
the best way to test theories, then one ought to be able to 
train subjects to falsify and see that training work when 
subjects tackle problems that model scientific reasoning.
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Should Groups Falsify?
All the experimental studies of scientific problem­
solving have focused on whether individuals working separ­
ately can effectively employ a disconfirmatory strategy.
But some of the most significant advances in science have 
been made by groups of scientists working together, including 
the development of atomic energy (Sherwin, 1973) and the 
discovery of DNA (Judson, 1979) . There are scientists like 
Einstein who do much of their work alone, but even these 
'loners' communicate constantly with colleagues through 
journals, conferences and correspondence.
Is falsification a practical strategy for every member 
of a scientific community? A number of the scientists stud­
ied by Mitroff (1974) argued that researchers should be 
committed to their hypotheses and defend them against dis­
proof. Einstein did just that with his theory of special 
relativity and his theory was correct, not the experimental 
evidence. As A. S. Eddington remarked, "It is...a good rule 
not to put too much confidence in the observational results 
that are put forward until they are confirmed by theory" 
(quoted in Judson, 1979, p. 93). There are times when theory 
should take precedence over empirical evidence.
If one scientist argues vehemently for his or her hypo­
theses , others will have to provide powerful disconfirmatory 
evidence before the theory will be rejected by the scien­
tific community. Rather than having every researcher adopt 
a disconfirmatory strategy, it may be better for science to
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operate on this kind of an adversary system, each theory 
having its proponents who try to confirm it and its opponents 
who try to disprove it.
At this time, it is impossible to say which approach is 
best for science. But it should be apparent that a strategy 
that works well for isolated individuals may not work well 
for groups. There is a need for research comparing how 
groups use confirmatory and disconfirmatory reasoning.
Unfortunately, none of the studies of scientific reason­
ing have included groups. But there is an extensive litera­
ture concerning the advantages and disadvantages of problem­
solving in groups.
Group Problem-Solving
Gerald Holton argues that "the contributions of n really 
good persons working in related areas of the same field are 
likely to be larger (or better) than n times the contribu­
tion of any one of them alone in the field. This is true of 
a group as well as of individuals who do not work in physical 
proximity to one another" (1973, p. 409). So, a group of 
four scientists working in the same area would make more than 
four times the contribution of a single scientist working 
alone.
Holton's idea is not entirely supported by experimental 
research on group problem-solving, even though none of the 
group problem-solving studies have used tasks designed to 
model scientific reasoning. Shaw (19 32) compared the per­
formance of four-person groups and individuals working
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separately on the following problem:
On one side of a river are three wives and three husbands. 
All of the men but none of the women can row. Get them 
all across the river by means of a boat carrying only 
three at one time. No man will allow his wife to be in 
the presence of another man unless he is also there 
(Steiner, 1972, p. 19).
Sixty per cent of the groups solved the problem, as opposed 
to only fourteen per cent of the individuals. In other words, 
groups were almost exactly four times as successful as indivi­
duals. Given that there were four people in each group, Shaw's 
finding can be interpreted to mean that groups do no better 
than the best of an equal number of individuals working separ­
ately. Subsequent research on tasks similar to Shaw's supports 
this conclusion (Marquart, 1955; Steiner, 1972).
Type of task is important. Groups will do better than 
an equal number of separate individuals on tasks that are 
divisible into sub-tasks, if each group member has special 
skills relevant to one or more sub-tasks (Steiner, 1972). The 
team of scientists that developed the atomic bomb is a good 
example: chemists, physicists, engineers and politicians
handled different aspects of this highly complicated, divi­
sible task (Sherwin, 1973). No one scientists or technician 
could have come close to solving this problem.
The tasks used by Shaw (1932), Marquart (1955) and others 
— on which groups did only as well as the best of an equal 
number of individuals working separately— are not divisible. 
They are what Steiner (1972) calls 'Eureka' problems: the
solution comes to a single person in a 'flash' of insight.
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Lorge and Solomon created a mathematical model to pre­
dict group performance on a Eureka task. "If, in a given 
population, the proportion of people not possessing the 
ability . . . is Q, the probability of drawing at random from 
the population a single person who will not have the abil­
ity to solve the problem is Q. The probability that nobody 
in a randomly assigned group of size n will have the ability 
to solve the problem is Qn , and the probability that at least 
one member of the group will be able to solve it is 1-Qn . 
Thus, if the presence of at least one competent member is 
sufficient to guarantee group success, the proportion of 
successful groups will equal 1-Qn" (Steiner, 1972, p. 20).
In Shaw's study, the proportion of individuals who 
solved the problem working alone was .14, so P=.14 and Q=.86. 
Since there were four members in each of Shaw's groups, the 
probability that at least one member of each group would
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solve the problem was 1-(.14) , or .596. The actual propor­
tion of groups that solved was .6, so the Lorge-Solomon model 
is a good predictor in this case. The model has been suc­
cessfully applied to other, similar studies (Steiner, 1972).
Holton's remark that "the contributions of n really good 
persons working in related areas of the same field are likely 
to be larger (or better) than n times the contribution of 
any one of them alone in the field" would seem to hold true 
for divisible tasks, but not for 'Eureka' problems that can 
be solved by one individual's insight. A good example of 
such a Eureka insight is Einstein's special theory of
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relativity. He exposed some serious logical inconsistencies 
in the physics of his day and resolved them by means of a 
dramatic new theory (Holton, 1973). One of the paradoxes 
that absorbed Einstein was how a beam of light would look if 
he could run as fast as it. It had never occurred to any­
one else to puzzle over such a problem. This kind of imagina­
tion was critical to the development of the special theory 
of relativity.
Therefore, it appears that scientific problems which 
require a kind of 'Eureka' insight can be solved at least as 
easily by a talented individual as by a group. Scientific 
problems that can be divided into sub-tasks are much easier 
for groups to solve— because each member of the group can 
focus on part of the problem. But these conclusions should 
be subjected to further experimental test, because none of 
the group problem-solving studies have used tasks specifically 
designed to model scientific reasoning and/or have included 
scientists as subjects.
The Present Study 
So far, we have discussed two separate experimental re­
search traditions: falsification by individuals, and group
problem-solving. The present study is an attempt to combine 
elements of both in a single experiment.
Why an experiment? The advantage of using a laboratory 
simulation of science is that one can manipulate variables 
like type of strategy while eliminating the effects of other
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variables via control procedures. It is hard to disentangle 
the effects of one variable from another in the 'real world1; 
proper laboratory procedures permit a clear test of how, for 
example, confirmatory and disconfirmatory strategies affect 
performance on a particular problem.
The disadvantage of experiments is that laboratory simu­
lations are not perfect models of the things they are design­
ed to simulate. One usually sacrifices realism for control 
in an experiment.
The obvious solution to this dilemma is to tackle a 
problem using multiple methods— experiments, surveys, bio­
graphies, historical studies, interviews, etc. Since there 
are few experimental studies of scientific problem-solving, 
and no studies concerning how groups solve scientific pro­
blems , I chose to do an experiment involving groups and a 
task that models scientific reasoning.
To combine the two research traditions discussed earlier, 
the experiment presented here involved manipulation of three 
variables.
(1) Strategy: To see whether falsification is an effective 
strategy for individuals working in communication with one 
another, groups of four subjects were told to adopt either
a confirmatory or a disconfirmatory strategy on a task that 
models scientific reasoning.
(2) Communication: To see whether individuals working to­
gether would do better than individuals working separately, 
subjects were run in either of two kinds of groups. Members
of interacting groups worked together and discussed ideas 
freely. Members of co-acting groups worked separately and 
kept their guesses to themselves.
So, each group of four subjects was assigned to one of 
four conditions: 1. an interacting group told to use a
disconfirmatory strategy; 2. an interacting group told to 
use a confirmatory strategy; 3. co-acting/disconfirmatory;
4. co-acting/confirmatory. All subjects were run under the 
same conditions on the third variable.
(3) Task; The task used in the present study had to fulfill 
four requirements:
(a) It had to be a good model of scientific reasoning, parti­
cularly of the Eureka-type, because most previous studies of 
scientific problem-solving had used Eureka problems.
(b) It had to be simple, so subjects could potentially solve 
it in the short time they would be together in the labora­
tory.
(c) It had to be divisible into a sequence of related sub­
tasks that increased in difficulty, so groups could gain 
experience working together on simpler problems before tack­
ling harder ones.
(d) Like Wason1s and Mynatt et al.'s tasks, the one used in 
the present study had to permit subjects to perform experi­
ments to test their guesses. Subjects should be able to de­
sign both confirmatory and disconfirmatory experiments.
Fortunately, such a task exists.
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New Eleusis
The card game "New Eleusis," as described by Martin 
Gardner in one of his Scientific American columns (October,
19 77), is explicitly designed to model the "search for 
truth." "...Eleusis is of special interest to mathematicians 
and scientists because it provides a model of induction, 
the process at the very heart of the scientific method... 
Eleusis was invented in 1956 by Robert Abbott...He had been 
studying that sudden insight into the solution of a problem 
that psychologists sometimes call the 'Aha' reaction. Great 
turning points in science often hinge on these mysterious 
intuitive leaps. Eleusis turns out to be a fascinating sim­
ulation of this facet of science" (Gardner, 1977, p. 18).
Here is a task that fulfills requirement (a): it models
the Eureka aspect of scientific reasoning. Eleusis is usually 
played by four or five people. The dealer makes up a rule 
that determines when a card will be right and when it will 
be wrong. Rules can be simple or complex, straightforward 
or ambiguous; therefore, Eleusis fulfills requirement (b).
The other players take turns playing cards, with the dealer 
telling them which are right and which are wrong. Correct 
cards continue in a straight line; incorrect cards are placed 
at right angles, under the card they followed.
For example, if the rule is "red and black cards must 
alternate," the sequence might end up looking something like 
this after a few cards had been played: (H=hearts, D=
diamonds, S=spades, Q=queen)
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10H 5C 2D 7S 4H 3C 9D QC
9S 7D 6S
QC QD
Players can always see the results of each others' past 
card plays, or experiments.
Requirement (c) was fulfilled by designing a set of 
four relatively simple rules that increased in difficulty, 
with solutions to later, more complex rules building off 
solutions to the earlier, simpler ones. In this way, inter­
acting groups, like scientific research teams, could gain 
experience working together, starting with simpler problems 
and building to more complex ones.
Martin Gardner claims that Eleusis "provides a model of 
induction, the process at the very heart of the scientific 
method." But Hume and Popper have raised serious question 
about induction: it is not a truly valid form of inference
and most scientists don't really use it (Popper, 1962). 
Scientists don't merely 'observe': they look at the data in
the light of hypotheses they have already formed.
If Eleusis is a good model of induction, then it is not 
a good model of the ideal scientific procedure, as Popper 
sees it. The game is structured so that players are rewarded 
for getting cards right, which is why it is best played using 
a kind of inductive, confirmatory strategy: if your idea for 
a rule generates right answers, keep playing it. In most 
sciences, those whose experiments confirm their hypotheses 
are much more likely to get published and advance in their
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field (Spencer, Hartnett & Mahoney, 1980). So the emphasis 
on right answers in Eleusis may be a realistic simulation 
of the way science is conducted, but it does not conform to 
the Popperian ideal.
Fortunately, it is possible to transform Eleusis so that 
players will not be rewarded or punished for following any 
particular strategy— or even rewarded for following a discon­
firmatory strategy. Eleusis makes a very flexible task: 
with only a few modifications, it can be changed from a model 
of induction to a model of falsification by requiring play­
ers to write out their hypotheses, then test them by playing 
cards that should be wrong. In this way, Eleusis can be made 
to fulfill requirement (d).
Speculations Concerning the Results
Interacting groups could potentially pursue a discon­
firmatory strategy more consistently than co-acting groups, 
because interacting group members could learn to coordinate 
efforts on the earlier, easier rules, so that by the later 
rules, they would be falsifying systematically. In co-acting 
groups, each individual would be more likely to pursue his 
or her own strategy, independently of other group members.
So, if Popper's ideas concerning the advantages of fal­
sification are correct, then interacting groups trained to 
falsify have the potential to do better than co-acting groups. 
Conversely, interacting groups trained to confirm should do 
worse than co-acting, because group members will be consis­
tently pursuing a disadvantageous strategy.
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Of course, all of this assumes that interacting group 
members will be able to coordinate efforts. The literature 
on group problem-solving indicates that there are many situa­
tions in which the processes by which an interacting group 
arrives at a decision are so inefficient that the group per­
forms much worse than one would expect (Steiner, 1972;
Hoffman, 1979).
Three Comparisons Between Interacting and Co-Acting Groups
There are three comparisons that should be made across 
the intragroup communications variable.
Interacting groups vs. the best co-actor on each rule.
Will the best individual in each co-acting group on each sub­
task perform better than the interacting groups? Marquart 
(1955) found that on a single task, there was no difference 
in performance between an interacting group and the best of 
an equal number of individuals. So if we compare performance, 
sub-task by sub-task, looking to see if any member of each 
co-acting group solved each rule, there should be no differ­
ence between interacting and co-acting groups.
Interacting groups vs. the best co-actor across the four 
rules. Will interacting groups perform better than the best 
individual in each co-acting group when best is defined as 
the person who solves the most rules? Steiner (1972) argues 
that, on a task that is divisible into sub-tasks, interacting 
groups will perform better than an equal number of individuals 
working separately. The four Eleusis rules used in the present
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study can be viewed as parts of a single, divisible task be­
cause the rules are related: solving each rule makes it
easier to solve the next. If we take the member of each co­
acting group who does the best across all four rules, his or 
her performance should be worse than that of an interacting 
group— because in an interacting group, one person can solve 
the first rule, share his or her solution with the others and 
make it possible for someone else to solve the second rule.
Do interacting groups solve a higher percentage of pro­
blems than co-actors? This comparison comes closest to 
Marjorie Shaw's (1932) observation that groups solved a higher 
percentage of problems than individuals working separately.
In the present study, Shaw's finding should certainly be re­
plicated: the proportion of successful interacting groups
should be much greater than the proportion of successful co­
acting individuals. But the co-acting individuals are not 
working in complete isolation. They do share a certain amount 
of information with each other. So the results of the present 
study might differ from Shaw's.
One other dependent variable that is commonly studied in 
the literature is time to solution. Individuals working 
separately are almost always faster than interacting groups 
(Kelley & Thibaut, 1969). This relationship should hold in 
the present study: those co-acting individuals who solve
the problem should take less time than groups working togeth­
er. Co-actors should also take less time to make a decision 
concerning when to give up and admit they can't solve the
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problem. Groups are rarely efficient in terms of time.
Their main advantage— when they have one at all— is in terms 
of quality of solution.
How the Present Study Relates to the Practice of Science
The laboratory simulation of scientific problem-solving 
presented here is a very simplified model of scientific pro­
cesses in the real world. The interacting/co-acting comparison 
is analogous to a comparison between research teams that work 
together and scientists that see only the results of each 
others' experiments in journals. The confirmatory/disconfir- 
matory comparison is analogous to a comparison between sci­
entists who seek to verify hypotheses and scientists who try 
to disprove them. But the analogy is weak— especially as the 
subjects in the present study will be introductory psychology 
students, not scientists.
The game "New Eleusis" is a good model of scientific 
problem-solving (Romesburg, 1979). But the four rules used 
in the present study are much simpler than most real scienti­
fic problems. Eleusis rules of great complexity could be 
developed for use in future studies, but it seemed better to 
begin with relatively simple ones that most college students 
could potentially solve in a short time.
So, the results of the present study can only be gener­
alized to the process of scientific discovery with the 
greatest caution. The laboratory is a long way from reality. 
But this study is intended as only the first, exploratory
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step towards more realistic experimental simulations of 
science. Eventually, scientists themselves can be brought 
into the laboratory and ashed to solve Eleusis rules of 
enormous complexity. Simulations of the growth and develop­
ment of science could be set-up, using college students.
The possibilities are endless. The main purpose of the pre­




One-hundred-and-seventy-two introductory psychology 
students at the University of New Hampshire participated in 
this experiment. They were run in groups of four. An effort 
was made to insure that there were two males and two females 
in each group. On rare occasions, three members of one sex 
and one of another had to be run. All subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of the four possible combinations of the 
Strategy and Communication variables.
Data from three groups (twelve subjects) had to be drop­
ped because of procedural errors made by the experimenter.
Procedures
Each subject was handed one of four cards marked "I," 
"J," "K," or "L" before he or she entered the experimental 
room. The letters corresponded to seats around a rectangular 
table. Same-sex pairs were handed either I and K or J and L 
to insure that they faced each other.
Once all subjects were seated, the experimenter handed- 
out written instructions and read them aloud. The first 
sheet of instructions concerned the task subjects were going 
to have to perform. The game "NewEleusis," discussed in 
the last section, was modified to fit the needs of the pre­
sent experiment. Subjects were told that they would be 
dealt a hand of thirteen cards from a shuffled deck. Each
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person would then play a card, in order. After a card was 
laid on the table, the experimenter would indicate whether it 
was right or wrong and put it in the appropriate place in the 
sequence. Correct cards would continue in a straight line; 
incorrect cards would go off at right angles.
The experimenter then showed subjects an example of a 
simple rule: "red and black cards must alternate." Subjects
were also made aware of the numerical values of the cards:
Ace is a one, Jack is an eleven, Queen is a twelve and King 
is a thirteen.
The first sheet of instructions concluded by pointing 
out that there would be four separate tasks. Subjects would 
play sixty cards on each and be limited to half-an-hour in 
which to guess the rule. To make sure subjects always had 
a card to play, each time a person played a card that was
wrong, he or she would be given two additional cards. It was
emphasized that this was not a penalty or punishment of any 
kind; in fact, the more cards one had, the better off one 
was.
The next sheet of instructions gave subjects specific 
directions for writing-out their guesses, including how to 
put down the time and card number on which they made their 
guess. When the group or an individual got ready to make a
guess, they told the experimenter, who read them the time and
made sure they had the correct card number. Time was measured 
in five-second intervals on a Hewlett-Packard 67 calculator, 
which has a timing program. The time provided a measure of
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speed to solution, while the number of cards provided a rough 
measure of the amount of information available as of each 
guess. Subjects were also told they would not get any feed­
back on whether their guesses were right or wrong until the 
end of the experiment.
Independent Variables
After the procedure for making guesses was explained to 
subjects, including the fact that they could make as many 
guesses as they wanted, subjects were either told to make 
their guesses as a group (interacting condition) or keep track 
of their guesses separately (co-acting condition). In the 
former case, it was emphasized that subjects should discuss 
their ideas freely and even make suggestions concerning what 
card should be played next. In the latter case, it was em­
phasized that subjects should not say anything to one another 
about their guesses or ideas.
Next, subjects were given a final sheet which contained 
a list of "Good Strategies for Guessing Patterns." First, all 
groups were urged to "guess early, guess often." It was hoped 
that this suggestion would encourage subjects to leave a 
record of all their ideas on each task.
Second, half the groups were urged to "systematically 
test your guesses by looking carefully at previous mistakes 
and by playing cards you are sure will be wrong." The other 
half were told nothing about mistakes and urged to test their 
guesses by playing cards they were sure would be right. The 
former strategy is disconfirmatory, the latter confirmatory. 
Upon completing the instruction, subjects began on the
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four rules. In the order in which subjects saw them, they 
were:
1. The next card must be one higher or lower than the pre­
ceding card.
2. The next card must be the same as, one higher or lower 
than, or two higher or lower than the preceding card.
3. Odd and even cards must alternate: an even card can never 
follow an even card and an odd card can never follow an odd 
card.
4. Cards can alternate odd-even, or red-black, or both. If 
an even card follows an even card of the same color, or an 
odd card follows an odd card of the same color, it is wrong. 
Any other two-card combination is possible.
The first three rules all concern the numerical values 
of the cards and can be solved by focusing on the differences 
between two adjacent cards. Even the third rule can be 
stated in terms of differences: if the difference between
two adjacent cards is odd, one will be odd and the other will 
be even.
The fourth rule combines two dimensions— color and 
number— and can be solved only by attending to both of them 
at the same time. But both dimensions are ones the subjects 
have encountered previously. The odd-even dimension formed 
the basis for the preceding rule, and alternating colors 
was used in the initial instructions as an example of how 
Eleusis is played.
If subjects adopt a purely confirmatory strategy, they
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can generate right answers to all four rules by playing ac­
cording to the first rule: cards must be separated by a
difference of one. Information derived solely from right 
answers will be misleading. To guess the four rules cor­
rectly, subjects will have to make use of information derived 
from mistakes. Hence, a disconfirmatory strategy should be 
superior to a confirmatory one.
Dependent Measures
The term dependent is used to refer to the class of 
variables that are dependent on subjects' responses. Four 
measures were used to assess subjects' performance:
1. The guesses: For purposes of analysis, correct guesses
were coded as ones and incorrect guesses are zeroes. A re­
cord was kept of all individual guesses in the co-acting con­
dition and all group guesses in the interacting condition.
2. Number of cards: Each time subjects wrote down a guess, 
they also wrote down the number of cards that had been played 
on that rule as of the point where they made the guess. There­
fore, card totals could be anywhere between one and sixty.
3. Time to solution: Every time subjects made a guess, they
also wrote down the time, in seconds, that had elapsed since 
the beginning of that rule. Separate times were therefore 
available for each of the four rules.
4. Mistakes: The total number of cards each group got wrong
on each rule was noted. This record provided a manipulation- 
check for the strategy condition: disconfirmatory groups
should make more mistakes than confirmatory.
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In addition to the performance measures, all groups were 
tape-recorded to provide information about group processes.'*' 
After subjects had completed the four tasks, they were 
given a questionnaire which asked them about their previous 
experience with card games, the number of science and math 
courses they had taken in college, their reactions to the task 
and whether they had found the suggestions concerning strat­
egies helpful. Information regarding their major, their class 
in college (freshman, sophomore, etc.) and whether they had 
a close friend in the group was also obtained.
At the end of the experiment, subjects were debriefed 
and sworn to secrecy. The debriefing included a review of the 
procedures, the correct solutions to the rules and the ration­
ale behind the design. It should be emphasized that this was 
the only time subjects were given any feedback on their 
guesses. After the debriefing, subjects were thanked for 
their participation.
Overview of the Design 
The design is what Winer (1971) calls a three factor 
experiment with repeated-measures on one factor. There are 
two between-group factors: type of strategy and intragroup
communication. The task is a within-group factor: all groups
get the same task and within each group the task is varied 
in the same way— by splitting it into four rules. The fact
^"Unfortunately, due to a lack of experimental assistants, 
tapes could not be coded so as to provide quantitative infor­
mation concerning the kinds of remarks made by specific in­
dividuals.
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that subjects' performance on the task is assessed four times 
makes task a repeated-measures factor.
So, the design is a 2 X 2 X 4, with 2 (interacting or 
co-acting) by 2 (confirmatory or disconfirmatory) levels of 
the two between-group factors and 4 (the four Eleusis rules) 
levels of one within-group factor.
III. Results
Each of the three major dependent measures was analyzed 
using a 2 X 2 X 4 split-plot analysis-of-variance. This 
technique is described in Winer (1971, pp. 559-571) and Kirk 
(1968, pp. 283-294).
Questionnaire data was analyzed via a series of linear 
regressions.
Interacting Groups Vs. the Best Co-Actor on Each Rule
The first ANOVA compares the number of correct solutions 
obtained by interacting groups to the number of correct solu­
tions obtained by the best co-acting individual on each rule, 
where best is defined as the person who solves each rule 
using the least cards and taking the least time. If only one 
co-actor solved each rule in a particular group, the group's 
score was all ones— even if a different person was success­
ful on each task. This comparison is most rigorous, in that 
it demands interacting groups perform better than any co­
acting individual.
The ANOVA table:
Source SS df F
C . 10 1 .46
S .02 1 .11




Source SS df F
T 2. 87 3 6.21
CT . 30 3 . 65
ST .47 .3 1.03
CST .20 3 . 43
Er 16.65 108
The only significant effect on this comparison is a 
main-effect for task. Neither the strategy nor communication 
variables significantly affected the number of correct solu­
tions a group obtained.
A look at the actual number of successful solutions (where 




Rule 1 2 3 4
Disconfirmatory 9 8 7 6
Confirmatory 9 9 9 6
Disconfirmatory 8 10 7 7
Confirmatory 8 9 7 3
34 36 30 22
Reading horizontally, one can see that the number of successes 
decreases as rule increases. But, except on task four, the 
number of successes are relatively equal across the other 
two factors. Only on task four is there any appearance of a 
difference due to either the communication or strategy vari­
ables. In the co-acting confirmatory condition, only three
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groups solved the fourth rule. But a separate ANOVA of solu­
tions on rule four revealed no significant effects (see 
Appendix for source table). This means that we cannot be 
sure that the difference between the co-acting confirmatory 
groups and other groups on rule four wasn't simply due to 
chance.
There is one major problem with assessing the effects 
of the task in the present study. The fact that performance 
declined across the four rules could be due either to fatigue 
or an increase in rule-difficulty. Given that the effects of 
fatigue and practice might be expected to cancel each other 
out, however, it is likely that the main effect for task re­
flects an actual increase in the difficulty of the rules.
Analyses were also done on the number of cards and the 
amount of time (in seconds) it took successful groups to reach 
a solution. The number of cards is a rough measure of the 
amount of information each of the successful interacting groups 
and best co-acting individuals needed. This ANOVA was con­
ducted in a slightly different way than the standard repeated- 
measures approach we have talked about all along. A repeated- 
measures analysis is not appropriate because most groups solved 
less than four rules, and consequently did not have scores on 
all four levels of the repeated measure. So a standard 
between-groups analysis was done, using the strategy and 
communication factors and treating the number of cards each 
group required to solve each rule as independent scores. There 
were potentially forty such scores in each cell (four per 
group) but in fact each cell had less.
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The two independent variables had no effect on the num­
ber of cards required to reach a solution (see Appendix for 
source table). Those disconfirmatory groups that solved 
rules required no more information than confirmatory; simi­
larly interacting groups required just as much information as 
co-acting groups. But remember, amount of information is 
also dependent on the kind of cards that have been played.
One card that disproves a false theory can be worth thirty 
cards that appear to confirm it.
A similar analysis was performed using time-in-seconds 
as the dependent variable. Again, each individual time-to- 
solution was treated as a separate score, not as one of a 
series of four repeated-measures. The analysis turned up a 
significant main-effect for the communication variable:
Source ss df F
C 674961 1 5.12*
S 1210 1 .009
CS 145 1 .001
Er 156837484 119
The tiny F-ratios for the Strategy main-effect and the inter­
action indicate that the time data may not be normally distri­
buted. So, both time and card data were transformed to make 
their distributions more normal in shape. Analyses of trans­
formed scores produced the same effects as those of untrans­
formed scores (see Appendix for details and source tables).
Interacting groups took an average of 583.5 seconds to 
reach a solution. The best co-acting individuals took an
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average of 4 35.3 seconds to reach a solution. Again, only 
groups that actually got a given rule right were included in 
this analysis. The difference was statistically significant 
(p < .025).
So, given that interacting groups and the best co-acting 
individual do not differ in performance, the co-acting indi­
viduals are more efficient problem-solvers: they take less
time.
Standard repeated-measures analyses of time and card 
number were also performed— to see if time and cards to com­
pletion changed across the four rules. Those groups who did 
not solve a particular rule were assigned the time and card 
number at which they gave up. Because all groups had to play 
60 cards, those groups who played 60 and could not make a 
guess were assigned a card-number of 61: it would have taken
at least 61 cards for them to come up with a guess.
The problem with doing the standard repeated-measures 
analysis of all these scores is that groups who solved a 
given rule almost invariably took less time and cards than 
those groups that kept wrestling with the problem until close 
to the time-limit. Even though the difference was not signif­
icant, less co-acting individuals— particularly in the co­
acting confirmatory cell— solved rules than interacting groups. 
A difference in time-to-completion, therefore, reflects a dif­
ference in solutions as well as a difference in times, because 
groups that failed to solve tended to take much longer.
But the analysis is valuable as a supplement to the time 
and card-to-solution analyses. Also, it provides another
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check on task difficulty: if the tasks are increasingly dif­
ficulty, we would expect them to take more cards and time to 
solve as we progress from one to four.
There is a significant task effect on cards-to-completion 
(F(3,108) = 9.7, p < .0001) and on time-to-completion 
(F(3,108) = 19, p < .0001). (See Appendix for source tables.) 
A look at the means shows that the rules did generally in­
crease in difficulty:
Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule 4 
Cards-to-completion 31 35 41 49
Time-to-completion 433 537 689 670
(in seconds)
The last two rules do not differ in the amount of time it 
takes to solve them, but otherwise, time and number of cards 
increase in linear fashion across the four rules. The rules 
do appear to increase in difficulty, although fatigue effects 
may play a role in decreased performance, especially on the 
last rule.
The time analysis also showed the same main-effect that 
was revealed by the time-to-solution analysis. Interacting 
groups do take longer than the best co-acting individuals, 
even when time-to-completion is used as the criterion 
(F(1,36) = 4.26, p < .05).
Interacting Groups Vs. the Best Co-Actor Across All Four Rules 
Steiner (1972) predicted that interacting groups would 
perform better than the best of an equal number of individuals
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on a divisible task. If the four Eleusis rules are treated 
as parts of a single, divisible task, interacting groups 
should be more successful than the best co-actor, when 'best' 
is defined as the individual in each co-acting group who is 
most successful across the four rules.
For the present comparison, a single co-actor was selected 
from each group: the one who got the most rules right, using
the least amount of time and cards (if two or more indivi­
duals solved the same number of rules). One other criterion 
was used. In one or two cases, one individual solved the 
first or second rule and another solved the third or fourth. 
Since rules three and four are clearly more difficult than 
one and two, in cases where two or more co-actors were tied 
in number of solutions within the group the best co-actor 
was the one who solved the higher rules.
The difference between the performance of the interacting 
groups and the best co-actor across all four rules is margin­
ally significant (F(l,36) = 2.93, p < .095). (See Appendix 
for source table.)
Comparing interacting groups and the best co-actor 
across four tasks on the time- and cards-to-completion 
dependent measures revealed no significant differences (see 
Appendix for source tables). The best co-actor across the 
set of problems requires the same amount of time and infor­
mation to see each solution as an interacting group.
Do Interacting Groups Solve a Higher Percentage of Problems
Than Co-Actors?
48
This comparison corresponds to the one used by Marjorie 
Shaw in her classic (19 32) study of differences between group 
and individual problem-solving. Here is a breakdown of per­
centages of correct solutions, task-by-task:




















There is no statistical test that can be used to deter­
mine whether these differences arose by chance— but this kind 
of difference has been found consistently in studies over the 
years (Davis, 1969; Steiner, 1972). It is a stable, reliable 
finding. In this study, interacting groups were successful 
79% of the time; co-acting individuals were successful only 
33% of the time.
So, interacting groups solved more Eleusis rules than 
co-acting individuals. Interacting groups also solved more 
rules than the best of an equal number of co-actors when 
'best' means most successful across all four rules. But 
interacting groups were no more successful than the best of 
an equal number of co-actors when 'best' means most successful 
on each rule.
Mistakes
The number of cards each group got wrong was analyzed
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using a repeated-measures ANOVA. In this case, the dependent 
measure was number of cards wrong out of the total of sixty 
each group played on each rule.
Source SS df F
C 6 1 .2
S 158 1 6.3* p<.02
CS 71.5 1 2.9
Er 900.1 36
T 2907.8 3 46.2* pc.0001
CT 128.2 3 2
ST 197.5 3 3.1* p<.05
CST 10.7 3 .2
Er 63.6 108
There is a significant main-effect for strategy. Dis­
confirmatory groups made an average of about twenty mistakes 
per rule, whereas confirmatory groups made only eighteen.
The difference, although statistically significant, is quite 
small. There is also a significant strategy-by-task inter­
action, reflecting the fact that confirmatory groups made 
more mistakes on rule 1, but disconfirmatory groups made more 
mistakes on the other three rules.
Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 Rule
Confirmatory 26 15.2 19.6 12.6
Disconfirmatory 24. 3 17.6 23.4 16
Overall 25.1 16.4 21.5 14. 3
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The scores in the table are all means. Note the large dif­
ferences in number of cards wrong across the four rules: 
one and three produced many more mistakes than two and four. 
Rule four, in particular, was designed to make it easy to get 
cards right: subjects can alternate colors, or odds and
evens, or play cards in order and never get a card wrong. 
Disconfirmatory groups got many more cards wrong on rule four 
than confirmatory groups; the difference on this rule alone 
was highly significant (F(l,36) = 6.27, p < .017). But there 
was no accompanying difference in performance.
When a regression is performed relating mistakes to
2
correct solutions on rule four, r equals .08. This means
that mistakes are very poor predictors of success on rule 4.
Across all four rules, mistakes are even worse predictors:
2r = .03. Getting cards wrong apparently does not make it 
any easier for groups to arrive at the correct solution.
Other Factors That Affect Group Performance 
The questionnaires subjects filled-out at the end of 
the experiment were analyzed to see if any of their answers 
predicted their performance. Two dependent variables were 
used in these regressions.
One was number of correct solutions. But this variable 
was computed in a way that reflected the relative difficulties 
of each rule. Rules one and two were assigned a value of one 
point apiece, rule three was assigned a value of two points 
and rule four was worth three points. The values reflect the 
fact that approximately equal numbers of groups solved rules
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one and two, many less solved rule three and still less solved 
rule four (see page 42). Why use points at all? Because a 
group that solved only rule four and a group that solved only 
rule one are not equal in performance: the group that solved
rule four is clearly superior, as that rule is much more 
difficult.
When ANOVAs are done using points as the dependent measure 
instead of the repeated-measures approach to analyzing per­
formance, there is still no difference in performance across 
the strategy and communication independent variables. (See 
Appendix for source tables.)
The second dependent-measure used in the regression anal­
yses was group rank. All groups were ranked on two factors—  
the quality of their solutions, based on success points, and 
how many cards they used. The highest group, for example, 
took 61 cards to score seven points (get all four rules right).
This particular group was interacting, as were all of the 
top five groups. A Mann-Whitney U test indicated that the 
difference between the ranks achieved by interacting and co­
acting groups was not significant, U = 224, p < .12.
The top group also included three seniors, each of whom 
had taken a large number of science and math courses. The 
worst group (co-acting and confirmatory) was composed en­
tirely of freshmen who had almost no science and math back­
ground. They failed to get a single rule right.
Perhaps class rank and number of mathematics and science 
courses were related to success. These factors were used as
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lone predictors of success and rank, or combined to see if 
several variables taken together made better predictions than 
one variable alone.
There were four individual scores for class rank, science 
courses, etc. within each group. These scores were summed to 
produce a single group predictor score. Class rank, for 
example, was scored on a one through four scale, where one 
equals freshman and four equals senior. A group of four 
seniors would have a total class rank of sixteen. Number of 
mathematics and science courses were also summed within each 
group. Sums were used instead of individual scores because 
group members' performances were not independent: how one
group member performed affected how all the others performed. 
In the interacting groups, all members made a single guess, 
together. In the co-acting groups, the best individual on 
each rule was used. But even his or her success was affected 
by the cards other group members played. A separate set of 
regressions were done using each co-acting individuals' rank 
and class scores to predict his or her success, and the pre­
dictive power was virtually nil (see Appendix for details).
2 2 A table of r s is presented below. Each r represents
the percentage of variance accounted for by each variable, 
or combination of variables. F-ratios were computed, com­
paring the amount of predicted variance to the amount of error 
variance. These F-values are not included in the table below,
but p-values denoting their levels of significance are placed
2





# Science Classes .04 .09
# Mathematics Classes .07 .1* p<.05
Class Rank .08 .16* p<.01
Class, Science and Math .09 .17
Science and Math .08 . 13
Class and Science .09 .16* p<.05
Class and Math .09 . 16*
No factor was very good at predicting group perfor­
mance, in terms of number and quality of solutions. But class 
rank and number of mathematics classes, singly and together, 
managed to account for at least ten per cent of the variance 
on the rank dependent measure. It is true that seniors who 
have good science and mathematics backgrounds are likely to 
do better on the task than freshmen with little science back­
ground— but that prediction is very uncertain. What little 
relationship there is depends heavily on the fact that the 
first group had three senior science students in it and the 
fortieth group had four freshmen with no science background. 
Even in that top group, the one freshman made important con­
tributions: the three seniors would not have done as well
without her. It is clear that class rank, science and math 
background are only minor factors in achieving correct solu­
tions to the four rules.
The questionnaire also asked subjects to rate their pre­
vious card-playing experience on a scale from one to five,
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where one equals almost no previous experience with card games
and five equals extensive experience. Using card-playing
2
experience to predict success produced an r equal to .003.
Card-playing experience was no help on the four rules.
Subjects were also asked to rate, on a scale from one
(strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree) whether they
agreed with the following statement: "If I am going to play
cards I would rather play an easy game than a difficult thought
game." Responses to this question were used to predict cor-
2
rect solutions; the resulting r equaled .1. Those subjects 
that prefer difficult games do slightly, but not significant­
ly, better on the four rules than subjects that prefer 
easier games.
When class rank and the difficult/easy question are
2combined as predictors of success, r = .17. But even this 
2
r is not significant even though it is higher than some of 
2
the r s on the previous page. The associated degrees-of- 
freedom are smaller— because the difficult/easy question only 
appeared on a later version of the questionnaire: about 
thirty of the forty groups saw it. The lower number of sub­
jects meant that degrees-of-freedom were lower and the error- 
term was larger.
The questionnaires did not discover factors that ac­
counted for a large part of the variance on the four Eleusis 
rules. Of the independent variables, only differences be­
tween the four rules seemed consistently related to number of 
correct solutions. In the next section, the implications of 
these results will be discussed.
IV. Discussion
The results of the present study replicate previous 
findings in the literature, using a novel task and design. 
Mynatt, Doherty and Tweney (1977) found that instructing sub­
jects to use either a confirmatory or a disconfirmatory strat­
egy did not affect their performance. Similar training also 
had no effect in the present study.
Marjorie Shaw's (1932) observation that interacting 
groups solve a higher percentage of problems than individuals 
working separately was replicated in the present study, with 
co-acting individuals playing the role of individuals working 
separately.
Steiner's (19 72) argument that interacting groups should 
do better on a divisible task than the best of an equal num­
ber of individuals working separately was also supported. If 
interacting groups are compared with the best co-actor in 
each group across all four rules— with the rules consti­
tuting four phases of a single task— then interacting groups 
do perform slightly (but not significantly) better. In 
several interacting groups, one member solved rule three and 
communicated his or her solution to the others, making it 
possible for someone else to see the solution to rule four. 
Rule four is very hard to get if one has not seen the odd- 
even pattern on rule three.
The interacting/co-acting difference on this comparison
55
56
might have been greater if interacting group members brought 
non-redundant resources to the task (Steiner, 1972). If 
each group member has special skills suited to a different 
aspect of a divisible task, then the group should perform 
much better than an equal number of individuals. Not even an 
Einstein could have developed the atomic bomb working alone, 
because the task required a coordinated effort on the part of 
chemists, physicists, engineers, politicians, etc.
Results also replicate the classic findings of Marquart 
(1955) and others (Steiner, 1972) that interacting groups per­
form no better and take more time on a single, non-divisible 
task than the best of an equivalent number of individuals 
working separately. According to the Lorge-Solomon model, 
on a Eureka-type task, the performance of interacting groups 
should equal 1 - Qn , where Q is the probability that one in­
dividual selected at random will not be able to solve the 
problem and n equals the size of the group. In the present 
study, we can estimate Q by taking the probability that a 
single co-acting individual will solve a given rule.
On rule four, for example, thirteen out of eighty co­
acting individuals were successful, so Q equals .84. Then 
the probability that an interacting group will solve rule 
four equals 1 - (.84)^, or fifty per cent. Half the inter­
acting groups, according to the Lorge-Solomon model, should 
have solved rule four. Actually, 60% did. The discrepancy 
is smaller on the other rules. On every rule, the Lorge- 
Solomon model predicts performance accurately.
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The interacting/co-acting comparison bears an almost 
perfect resembance to the interacting/concocted comparison. 
Interacting groups performed exactly as we would have expected 
from the literature, and co-acting individuals performed in 
a manner similar to individuals working separately.
Co-acting groups do share some information. If one mem­
ber plays cards sufficient to reveal the solution to one 
rule, it is quite possible that others will pick up on it. 
Still, in twenty-six out of the sixty solutions achieved by 
co-acting groups were the work of one person alone: no one
else in the same group saw them.
Since there was no control group in which individuals 
worked on Eleusis alone, we cannot be certain that the best 
co-acting individuals would not have performed better than 
the best of a concocted group— but it is not likely, consider­
ing that the interacting/co-acting difference mirrors the in­
teracting/concocting difference.
Why Do Interacting Groups Perform So Poorly?
Interacting groups clearly have an advantage over co­
acting groups on tasks that require a division of labor and 
in situations where group members have non-redundant re­
sources. But if an interacting group is poorly organized, 
members will not be able to take advantage of one another's 
resources and the group's product, even on a divisible task, 
will be no better than that of a co-acting group. This phe­
nomenon is referred to as 'process loss' in the group 
problem-solving literature (Hoffman, 1979). The process by 
which group members try to arrive at a decision is often so
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inefficient that the group performs at a level far below its 
potential. That is why the Lorge-Solomon model tends to 
over-predict group performance on a Eureka-type task.
Steiner lists some reasons why groups might perform 
more poorly than expected on a Eureka task: "(1) The group
will fail if none of its members possesses the resources 
demanded by the task. (2) The group will fail, or will func­
tion at a reduced level of effectiveness, if its processes 
are not in accord with task prescriptions. This will be the 
case if (a) the member(s) with the necessary resources does 
not use them to perform the unitary task; or (b) members with 
the necessary resources use them appropriately, but other 
members do not accept their contributions as the group's 
product (i.e., successful members are not accorded total 
weight)." (Steiner, 1972, p. 24). An example of a situation 
where process-loss occurs is a study by Torrance (1954). He 
asked B-26 bomber crews to solve a simple problem. The pilots, 
who were the commanders of the crews, were most successful 
at getting their opinions accepted, even when they were wrong. 
The leader or the majority in a group can ignore the opinions 
of those who are right.
It was hard for groups in the present study to organize, 
because most members began the sessions as strangers. One 
of the best interacting groups included two friends, one of 
whom became the group leader and the other of whom adopted 
a secretarial role, writing out the group's guesses. This 
group's organization was aided by the fact that the two
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friends slipped comfortably into their roles, the one domi­
nant, the other submissive. In the group that did the best, 
three members were friends, and worked together smoothly.
But many groups in which the members were strangers did 
well and some in which there were friends did poorly. If 
the right atmosphere prevails and group members learn to work 
together, even strangers will be able to accomplish things 
they could not do separately. Perhaps the best example of 
this phenomenon is a group which included two foreign stu­
dents who spoke little English. The two English-speaking 
students concentrated so much time and energy on explaining 
the rules to the two foreign students that they were forced 
to study their ideas carefully. The foreign students reci­
procated the others' concentration. The result was a group 
in which everyone worked hard and made important contribu­
tions. This group missed the first rule, but got the other 
three. Had these individuals worked as a co-acting group, 
the foreign students would not have been able to understand 
the rules at all. Unfortunately, due to a procedural error 
by the experimenter, the data from this group had to be drop­
ped from that analysis.
The five best groups, including three that got all four 
rules using less than a hundred cards, were from the inter­
acting condition. A study of tapes and notes on these groups 
reveals only one thing they had in common: in all five,
more than one group member contributed significantly to 
solving the rules.
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In two of the worst five interacting groups, one member 
dominated discussion and lead the group on a false track: 
persistently looking for a color pattern on rule three in 
one case. More than one person tried to contribute in the 
other three 'worst groups,' but the group still fell into a 
'set,' focusing on an irrelevant dimension. One group, for 
example, looked at differences between cards in terms of how 
many cards one had to 'skip.' A numerical difference of 
five is a 'skip' of four cards. Keeping track of the number 
of cards skipped proved too difficult: the group missed both
rules three and four. If one member had seen that odd dif­
ferences were the key to rule three, the group's performance 
would have been much better.
So, in a successful group, members have to criticize 
each other's approaches and look for alternatives. Other­
wise, the group may fall into a harmful set and focus per­
sistently on an irrelevant aspect of the cards.
Disconfirmatory instructions were an attempt to get 
group members to adopt a critical attitude. But the instruc­
tions failed: the best interacting groups were evenly divi­
ded between disconfirmatory and confirmatory conditions. 
Instructions in the present study focused on telling subjects 
to get cards wrong. Future studies should involve techni­
ques for getting interacting group members to criticize 
each others' ideas and develop alternative hypotheses, in 
addition to making mistakes.
Group process can be beneficial, but it can also hurt
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performance. A set is much harder to form in a co-acting 
group; if one member focuses on an irrelevant dimension, 
another member— pursuing a different strategy— will often play 
a card that disconfirms the first member's idea. Not sharing 
information can have advantages as well as disadvantages. If 
one co-acting individual starts off on an irrelevant tangent, 
he or she doesn't take the whole group with him or her.
For example, in one interacting group, subjects deli­
berately played the same sequence of cards twice on rule 
three, to see if the rule required those cards to be played 
in exactly that order. The sequence was 4, K, 6, 7, 8, 7, 4 
(the subjects were ignoring color) and it was played starting 
at card seven and later, starting at card twenty-nine. The 
rule in this case is odd-even, so clearly the sequence would 
work every time. All that was needed to break this sequence 
was a different pattern of odds and evens. In a co-acting 
group, there is a much greater chance that such a sequence 
would be broken immediately: if one member tried to play it,
another member pursuing a different idea would disconfirm the 
first member's.
Why Disconfirmatory Groups Did No Better Than Confirmatory
Co-acting groups were less likely to fall into a harmful 
set because members would naturally tend to disconfirm one 
anothers' ideas. But co-acting groups also could not pursue 
a consistently disconfirmatory strategy. It was the inter­
acting groups who had the greatest opportunity to take advantage
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of falsification. But the "Good Strategies for Guessing Pat­
terns" had no effect on interacting groups' performance.
A rough inspection of groups' actual strategies, using 
tapes and notes, indicates that most groups followed a com­
bined strategy— sometimes deliberately getting cards wrong, 
other times deliberately getting them right- Disconfirmatory 
groups in general made more deliberate mistakes (see Results, 
p. 49) indicating that most did try to follow their "Sugges­
tions." But the difference in number of mistakes between 
confirmatory and disconfirmatory is not that great; if groups 
really followed their strategies, it should have been greater. 
Also, although most subjects indicated the "Good Strategies 
for Guessing Patterns" were helpful, the part many remembered 
best was the suggestion to "guess early, guess often."
Why did the suggestions have so little effect? On the 
questionnaire, only eighteen per cent of the subjects told to 
disconfirm mentioned specifically that getting cards wrong 
was helpful and only two per cent of the confirmatory subjects 
mentioned that getting cards right was helpful. The confir­
matory instructions particularly made little impression on 
subjects. Part of the answer lies in the size of the indivi­
dual players' card hands. Each member of a group was given 
thirteen cards from a shuffled deck at the beginning of each 
rule. If a group started playing a long string of cards that 
differed by one, sooner or later one member would not have 
the appropriate card— especially since group members were 
only given extra cards when they made mistakes. So that
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individual would have to play a card at random. The card
might disconfirm the idea the group was working on. For
example, many groups started out playing a long string of 
ascending cards on rule one, e.g., A, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, J, Q. If the next player did not have a King, he or she 
might play a Jack, which would lead the group towards the 
real rule: adjacent cards must differ by one, regardless of
order. A number of groups would have missed rule one were it
not for a random play of this nature. The same kind of thing
happened on other rules as well.
In fact, if a random card disconfirmed an incorrect 
guess on rule one, subjects were more likely to ignore con­
firmatory suggestions and try to disconfirm guesses on later 
rules. One of the advantages of using a four-task sequence 
is that subjects could learn better strategies for solving 
rules. By rule three or four, most groups had developed their 
own way— good or bad— of tackling Eleusis problems and were 
ignoring the oft-repeated suggestions.
The fact that each group had to play sixty cards on each 
rule exacerbated this effect. The probability that somewhere 
in the sixty cards someone would play a random card that 
revealed the rule was very large, even in the confirmatory 
groups. Often groups would fail to get the rule even when 
they had full information, but the-playing of a random dis­
confirmatory card increased the possibility that a group would 
see the correct solution and that the group would deliberately 
play disconfirmatory cards on later rules.
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So, the lack of a difference between strategy conditions 
can be partially explained by the fact that subjects had 
limited choices, in terms of what card to play, and they were 
forced to continue playing even if they made an early guess. 
'Serendipity' is a term used in science to refer to a chance 
discovery. A classic example is the case of the mold that 
came in through the window and killed bacteria on one of 
Alexander Fleming's cultures. The mold produced Penicillin. 
Fleming was intelligent enough to make the most of his dis­
covery. Similarly, many groups in the present study obtained 
serendipitous information from a card played at random. It 
was quite common to see a group keep on playing cards that 
differed by one on rule three until someone was forced to 
play something out of sequence, like a Queen after a three.
The experimenter's "That's correct" was invariably followed 
by exclamations of surprise. Some groups were able to take 
advantage of this kind of information; others were not.
Disconfirmatory groups still should have done somewhat 
better than confirmatory. The "Suggestions" for disconfirma­
tory groups stressed looking at previous mistakes, as well as 
at right answers. In an alternating color rule, strings of 
mistakes will all be of the same color: red cards under a
red card, black cards under a black card. In an odd-even 
rule, there will be long strings of odd mistakes under some 
odd cards and even mistakes under some even cards. Apparently, 
disconfirmatory groups did not make any better use of this 
information than confirmatory.
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Disconfirmatory groups should also have falsified wrong 
ideas more rapidly than confirmatory; they should have re­
quired less time and cards to see the correct solution. A 
group that stumbles on disconfirmatory information by chance 
should discover it later than a group that is searching for 
it systematically.
In summary, the hypothesis that interacting-disconfirma- 
tory groups would do better than interacting-confirmatory 
was not borne out by the evidence. But it still may be true. 
There are some procedural problems in the present study that 
increase the likelihood of serendipitous disconfirmation.
What would happen if those problems were eliminated?
A Follow-Up Study
The author and several colleagues are currently conduct­
ing a study designed to follow-up this dissertation and dis­
cover if, under a different set of circumstances, there will 
be a difference between interacting-disconfirmatory and 
interacting-confirmatory groups. The procedures were the 
same as the ones used in the study described earlier except 
that:
a. Only interacting groups were run.
b. There was only one between-groups independent variable—  
strategy— with three conditions: confirmatory, disconfirma­
tory and a combined strategy, in which subjects were urged to 
get cards right until they had a guess, then test that guess 
by getting cards wrong.
c. Each subject was given a full deck of cards to play from.
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Every time he or she played a card, it was immediately re­
placed. This meant that each subject could always play what­
ever card he or she wanted.
d. Groups were allowed to stop working on a rule whenever 
they were sure they were right.
Procedures c and d insured that confirmatory groups poten­
tially could play a whole string of right answers without 
serendipitous disconfirmation, then quit and go on to the 
next rule without ever getting full, correct information.
On rule three, for example, a confirmatory group could play 
thirty cards that went up and down by ones and stop, con­
vinced that they had the rule— when the rule was actually odd 
and even cards must alternate.
The time and card number data have not been completely 
analyzed, but there is a strong difference between confirma­
tory and disconfirmatory strategies on number of correct solu­
tions. Out of eight confirmatory groups run, one solved all 
four rules, one solved three, one solved one and the rest did 
not solve any rules. Furthermore, the groups that did the 
worst were the ones that followed their strategy the most 
closely, making almost no mistakes.
Out of eight disconfirmatory groups, three solved two 
rules, three solved three rules and two solved all four. The 
combined strategy group fell in between the confirmatory and 
disconfirmatory: one group solved all four, two groups solved
three, three groups solved two and two solved one. A three- 
way ANOVA on correct solutions showed that the difference
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between these groups' performance on the strategy manipula­
tion was significant, F(2,21) = 5.04, p < .02. If all groups 
had strictly followed their instructions, this difference 
would be even greater. Confirmatory groups tended to make 
more mistakes than they should have, and disconfirmatory 
groups got too many cards right.
It appears that interacting-disconfirmatory groups will 
do better than interacting-confirmatory when members are 
given maximum freedom to conduct their own experiments and 
stop whenever they feel they have the right answer. Con­
firmatory groups often fell into the trap of playing a 
short string of right answers and then quitting, thinking 
they had found the rule.
Extending These Results to Science
The dangers of generalizing from a sample of college stu­
dents solving Eleusis rules to the behavior of scientists in 
the real-world were mentioned in the Introduction. Obviously, 
college students are not scientists and Eleusis is no more 
than a gross oversimplification of the kinds of problems most 
scientists actually face. Keeping these caveats in mind, 
let us speculate cautiously. What do these results suggest 
about how intragroup communication and the use of falsifica- 
tory strategies affect the scientific process?
1. On a Eureka-type task, the best of a number of scientists 
working separately and in limited communication with each 
other will do as well as scientists who work together in a 
face-to-face group. If the object is to solve a series of
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related Eureka-type problems, an interacting group may have 
a slight advantage if individual resources are redundant 
(i.e., all group members have similar training and skills) 
and a large advantage if each individual has a special skill 
or perspective to contribute to one or more aspects of the 
problem. Finally, the average scientist working separately 
will not do as well as a group of scientists working together.
2. A disconfirmatory strategy will lead to superior perfor­
mance in situations where scientists have the freedom to 
design whatever experiments they want. When laboratory sub­
jects were given only a limited range of card-choices and were 
forced to play sixty cards, a disconfirmatory strategy had 
no effect. But when subjects could play any card they wanted, 
and stop any time, a disconfirmatory strategy was much more 
effective than a confirmatory one.
Similarly, when scientists are limited to certain tests 
and are forced— by a grant, perhaps— to gather data for an 
extended period of time, serendipitous disconfirmation of the 
researchers' hypotheses may occur. The limitations on kinds 
of tests may be imposed by lack of equipment, or by ethical 
considerations (certain kinds of research cannot be done on 
animals and human beings), or even by the nature of the uni­
verse— a geologist cannot go back in time to study the Earth's 
surface as it appeared millions of years ago. In a card- 
game, we can give subjects freedom to construct any test of 
a rule they want, but in the real world, scientists are forced 
to operate within certain constraints.
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Still, experimenters are quite adept at arranging things 
so their pet hypotheses will be confirmed. A classic demon­
stration of the effect of rewards on behavior was done in 
the 1940s. Cats were put in a cramped box with a pole in 
the middle. When the cat rubbed the pole, the box opened.
The experimenters concluded that the cats learned to rub be­
cause it brought about an immediate reward— release from the 
box. Thirty years later, two researchers designed a discon­
firmatory study. They put cats in a similar box and gave them 
no reward. The cats rubbed the pole repeatedly, demonstrating 
that rewards had been unnecessary in the original experiment 
(Garcia, 19 80). Subjects solving Eleusis rules and scientists 
trying to solve the 'rules of nature1 can both profit by 
adopting a disconfirmatory strategy.
Future Research
To find out whether the ideas derived from the study of 
subjects in the laboratory really generalize to the behavior 
of scientists, it will be necessary to study scientists them­
selves. One way would be to bring scientists into the lab­
oratory and have them work in interacting and co-acting teams 
on Eleusis rules. This kind of study should be supplemented 
by work with research teams in the real world, like Mitroff's 
(1974) investigation of the Apollo scientists. Under what 
circumstances is it better for scientists to wrestle with a 
problem together, and when are they better off working alone? 
Can scientific groups pursue a disconfirmatory strategy better 
than individuals?
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More realistic laboratory simulations of science could 
also be done using college students. For example, one could 
take a group of junior and senior science majors and put them 
in a course designed to model the growth and development of 
a science.
The students would be asked to work— together and separ­
ately— on discovering the rules that govern a 'universe' 
created for the purposes of the experiment. The best way to 
design such a 'universe' would be to use a computer. Students 
could work at several different terminals, trying different 
experiments that would reveal the 'laws' governing the uni­
verse.
The experimenter could construct laws that dictated the 
behavior of particles in the imaginary universe— how they 
moved, how they interacted, how they combined to form larger 
bodies. This information would have to be discovered by the 
students, through clever experimentation. The simulation could 
be arranged so that it would be easy to form a simple theory 
of how the universe worked— a theory that would not hold up 
to rigorous, disconfirmatory testing.
Some of the contingencies that affect the progress of 
science in the real world could be modeled. Students' access 
to the computer terminals could be determined by fake 'funding 
agencies' that would reward only certain kinds of research—  
say, those experimenters whose predictions were confirmed. 
Students who did riskier projects and/or disconfirmatory 
studies would have difficulty getting access to terminals.
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Academic journals could also be simulated; students could be 
told to write up the results of their experiments, and ac­
ceptable articles could be reproduced and distributed. The 
students with the most publications would also be permitted 
more time on the computer.
The list of possible permutations is endless. Simula­
tions are far more realistic than short, little experiments. 
Simulations are also far more expensive and time-consuming.
But the potential rewards are tremendous. One could actually 
model the growth of a science under circumstances where key 
factors in scientific progress could be manipulated to assess 
their effects. This kind of work could even involve actual 
scientists as consultants and participants.
Simulation is not the only way to study the scientific 
process, but it is a method whose possibilities have not been 
fully realized. One possibility is to give subjects mone­
tary rewards for either getting cards right (confirmatory 
strategy) or getting them wrong (disconfirmatory strategy).
Even in my most recent study, groups showed a tendency to 
disregard their strategy instructions. Perhaps a monetary 
contingency would convince groups to adhere more closely to 
their strategies, and give a clearner test of the differences 
between confirmatory and disconfirmatory strategies.
Another possible way of obtaining the same information 
would be to ask groups to concentrate solely on either getting 
cards right or getting them wrong. After each group had played 
a certain number of right or wrong cards in a row (depending
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on which strategy it had been asked to adopt) the experimenter 
could ask the group to guess the rule. Groups that could 
not follow their strategy would be dropped from the analysis. 
Note that the focus here is on playing long strings of right 
or wrong cards, not on guessing the rule. This design would 
permit an assessment of how well subjects could create and 
make use of pure confirmatory or disconfirmatory information. 
While several groups in my most recent study played a pure 
confirmatory strategy, no group has ever played a pure dis­
confirmatory strategy.
Other ideas for future research include a questionnaire 
that assesses how well scientists employ modus tolens on 
Eleusis rules and a computer program that plays Eleusis, 
which a colleague of mine is working on. The computer's per­
formance using confirmatory and disconfirmatory strategies 
could be compared with that of human subjects.
The experiment outlined in these pages has already begun 
to fulfill its primary purpose: to suggest new ways of
simulating how science works in the laboratory. Another 
possible offshoot of the research presented here is techni­
ques to improve group problem-solving in general. A good 
strategy for a group might be to generate ideas in a brain­
storming session, then attempt to disconfirm each idea, 
using individual group member's unique resources and back­
grounds to come up with falsificatory evidence. The efficacy 
of this and other group problem-solving techniques can be 
investigated in further experimental simulations, coupled with 




ADDENDA TO THE RESULTS SECTION
Interacting Groups vs. the Best Co-Actor on Each Rule
ANOVA on number of correct solutions, Rule 4: (See page 43
for discussion)
Source SS df F
C . 1 1 .4
S .4 1 1.6
CS .4 1 1.6
Er 9.0 36
ANOVA on the number of cards required to reach a solution: 
(See page 43 for discussion)
Source SS df F
C 15. 7 1 . 05
S 93.8 1 . 33
CS 215. 3 1 .75
Er 33871.0 118
ANOVA on cards-to-completion: (See page 46 for discussion)
Source SS df F
C 65 1 . 1
S 140 1 .2
CS 722 1 1. 3
Er 19998 36
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Source SS df F
T 7532 3 9.7* p<.009
CT 247 3 . 3
ST 494 3 .6
CST 158 3 .2
Er 27891 108
:he card-number distribution approximate normality/
•e was transformed by taking its logarithm to the
The following source tables resulted:
solution:
Source SS df F
C . 0004 1 .006
S .04 1 . 56
CS . 13 1 .98
Er 7.69 119
completion:
Source SS df F
C .007 1 .08
S .052 1 .57
CS .253 1 2.75
Er 3. 311 36
T 1.6 3 10.03* p<.001
CT . 05 3 . 32
ST .07 3 .45
CST . 1 3 .61
Er 5. 77 108
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A square-root transformation was used to make the distinction 































Source SS df F
CS 109. 1 1.02
Er 3854.7 36
T 2911. 3 18.33* p<.001
CT 30.5 3 .19
ST 138.4 3 .87
CST 14.3 3 .09
Er 5716 108
The (+) denotes a marginally significant communication main- 
effect (p < .07). So, the transformation slightly reduces 
the effect of the communication variable on time, but does 
not affect the overall pattern of results.
Interacting Groups vs. the Best Co-Actor 
Across All Four Rules
ANOVA on number of correct solutions: (See page 47 for
discussion)
Source SS df F
C
inr-• 1 2.93
S .05 1 .22
CS .51 1 1.96
Er 9.28 36
The (+) denotes a marginally-significant communication main- 
effect (p < .095). The within-group part of the analysis 
showed the usual main-effect for task— later rules are more 
difficult to solve than earlier ones— and no interactions.
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On page 47, the reader is referred to this appendix for 
source tables comparing interacting groups and the best co­
actor across the four rules on time- and card-to-solution.
Only the source tables for transformed data will be reported 
here, because the transformed time and card scores come closer 
to satisfying the assumptions of the analysis-of-variance. 
(Analyses were also performed on the raw scores; the F-ratio 
for the communication main-effect on the time dependent 
measure was slightly higher than the same F-ratio for square- 
root- time— but neither was significant at the .05 level.)
Square-root of time-to-solution:
Source SS df F
C 168.13 1 2.79
S 1. 89 1 .03
CS . 85 1 .01
Er 6740.93 112
i to the base ten of cards-to-solution:
Source SS df F
C . 008 1 . 14
S .001 1 .02
CS .04 1 .65
Er 6. 83 112
Using points as a dependent-measure
On pages 50 and 51, a system of points that weights each 
rule according to its relative difficulty is described. When
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these points are used as the dependent-measure in a 2 X 2 
ANOVA, the following source table results:
Source SS df F
C 2.5 1 .59
S 1.6 1 .38
CS 8.1 1 1.8
Er 153.4 36
None of these F-ratios comes close to significance. When the 
same ANOVA is performed using the point-totals for the best 
co-actor across the four rules, there are still no significant 
differences.
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